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Interactive inventions are systems and processes that can be used by
multiple actors at the same time. Many interactive inventions are the
product of emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things that
allow billions of everyday devices to communicate with each other via
the Internet. Other interactive inventions are prevalent in the emerging
fields of personalized medicine and FinTech (new financial
technologies). Unfortunately, the law concerning how to determine
liability when a patent directed to an interactive invention is infringed is
dissonant across classes of inventions. Specifically, what it means to
“use” an interactive system is different from what it means to “use” an
interactive method. Why does the law treat these acts differently?
Should it?
This Article attempts to answer these important questions. Specifically,
this Article contends that the current framework for what it means to
“use” an interactive system is problematic. Interactive inventions are
different than traditional method and system inventions. Unfortunately,
courts have too often applied, especially in recent cases involving
interactive systems, an outmoded framework to interactive inventions.
When interactive inventions are analyzed under the proper framework,
it allows for the application of sound legal principles to solve multi-
actor liability problems. Specifically, this Article argues that a direct
infringer “uses” an interactive system when it controls the system and
obtains a benefit from it. This approach is also more consistent with the
recently broadened standard for infringement of interactive methods.
INTRODUCTION
One purpose of the U.S. patent system is to encourage innovation.1
When one thinks of innovation, devices that did not exist twenty years
ago like the self-driving car may come to mind. Thus, the patent sys-
tem helps bring into being what did not exist.2
It seems ironic then that the Patent Statute of 1952 (the “Patent
Statute”) defines only four classes of subject matter that can be pat-
1. Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1421 (2011) (explaining that intellectual property protection pro-
tects investments in commercializing and experimenting with untested business models); Michael
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590,
1624 (2011) (“The possibility of a patent likely will affect the amount and intensity of the
grantee’s research and thus can be viewed as a proximate cause of the innovation.”).
2. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 885 (1990) (discussing the role of pioneering patents in the evolution of
industry).
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ented.3 As defined in the statute, inventors may obtain patent protec-
tion for a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition.”4
“But wait,” you might say. “Haven’t inventors obtained patent pro-
tection for software, living organisms, business methods, and other in-
ventions that don’t fit neatly into one of the statutory classes?”5 The
fact is that several types of subclasses of inventions exist.
One such subclass is system inventions. System inventions are a par-
ticular type of machine or apparatus.6 A system is made up of one or
more components that work together to perform a function.7
As a corollary to subclasses, this Article suggests that a “superclass”
of inventions also exists. Interactive inventions are systems and
processes that are capable of being used by multiple actors at the
same time.8 This Article uses the term “superclass” to denote that
both systems and processes can be interactive inventions. Emerging
technologies such as the Internet of Things—which connects such dis-
parate devices as mobile phones, automobiles, thermostats, and refrig-
erators—are systems. These systems are used to carry out everyday
tasks as well as advanced processes. As the number of connected de-
vices continues to far exceed the number of people on the planet,9 the
number of patentable systems that perform patentable processes will
continue to grow. Platforms such as the Internet of Things will allow
many users to use these innovative systems and processes.
In fact, the ability for multiple actors to use interactive inventions is
what makes them unique. Both interactive system and method inven-
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
4. Id.
5. Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised
Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its
Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (2011) (discussing the development of the law
concerning the patentability of software and biotechnology).
6. See In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 762 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1980), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Claims 10-12 and 17-18 are directed to a “system,” i.e., apparatus, and are
identical in substance to the method claims with the exception that the term “means for” has
been inserted in front of each method step to convert the claims from method to apparatus
format.”).
7. Id. at 761.
8. Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (2013) (“From arcade to console and computer desktop to interactive
multiplayer network, the explosion in computer video games has been spurred by Internet acces-
sibility, whether for downloading and updating software, tendering payment, or finding and in-
teracting with other players.”).
9. See Oladayo Bello & Sherali Zeadally, Intelligent Device-to-Device Communication in the
Internet of Things, 10 IEEE SYS. J. 1172, 1172 (2016) (stating that “[b]y 2010, the number of
devices connected to the Internet rose to 12.5 billion while the world’s population increased to
6.8 billion . . . .”).
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tions are unique in that they may be used by one or more actors.10
These characteristics are important when trying to determine the type
of activity that may give rise to patent infringement.
This Article contends that the law’s recent interpretation of what it
means to “use” an interactive system is problematic because it applies
an outmoded framework to interactive inventions. It argues that inter-
active inventions should be treated differently from traditional
method and system inventions.11 When interactive inventions are ana-
lyzed under the correct framework, it allows for courts to apply sound
tort law principles to solve multi-actor liability problems; specifically,
that a direct infringer uses an interactive system when it controls the
system and obtains a benefit from it. This approach is more consistent
with the recently articulated standard for infringement of method
claims by multiple actors.
Direct infringement of a patented invention occurs when that inven-
tion is made, used, sold, offered for sale in the United States, or im-
ported into the United States without the patent owner’s
authorization.12 Thus, by itself, the “use” of a patented invention with-
out the patent owner’s authorization is infringement.13
Enforcing interactive system claims presents unique challenges for
patent law. Specifically, how does the law determine liability for direct
infringement when more than one entity uses various components of
the claimed system? Over the last decade, the Federal Circuit has
10. See Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1283–84 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (addressing infringement for “use” of a system claim that has elements in the posses-
sion of more than one party).
11. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV.
565, 596 (2017); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 388 (2014); Michael A. Carrier, Limelight v. Akamai: Limiting Induced
Infringement, 2014 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (2014) (“The Supreme Court’s Akamai decision
offers (at least) four lessons, which address: (1) the text of the Patent Act, (2) the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the Federal Circuit, (3) the question of direct infringement, and (4) policy
issues presented by congressional action.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptional-
ism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1008 (2017) (providing a comprehensive treatment of the unique
status of method claims in the patent landscape).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
13. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721, 732 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d and
remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (“Congress has . . . prescribed that whoever, ‘without authority,’ does
any one of the listed acts—‘the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing of a patented
invention.’”) (quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760 (2011)) (cit-
ing 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.01 (2015) (“The exclusive rights are disjunc-
tive: one may infringe by (1) making without selling or using, (2) using without making or selling
or (3) selling without making or using.”));WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS
§§ 903–906 (1890).); see also Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858,
861 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984) (“It is beyond argument that performance
of only one of the three enumerated activities is patent infringement.”).
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struggled to determine liability for the direct infringement of method
claims when more than one entity performs a step of the claimed
method.14
We should care about the tests used for determining infringement of
interactive inventions for several reasons. A great deal of innovation
is occurring in this area. Interactive technology has become increas-
ingly prevalent. Growth in demand for financial services and internet
retail has been driven in part by innovation and explosive growth in
the wireless industry.15 The United States has more mobile internet
users than any other country in the world.16 “Apps,” or applications
that run on smart mobile devices, have also contributed to the growth
of the wireless industry.17 According to Sensor Tower, a leading pro-
vider of mobile app data, 2018 mobile app sales generated over $70
billion dollars in revenue.18 Thus, the global economy has become de-
pendent upon this interconnected system of wireless devices, internet
storefronts, and financial services.19
It is also important that inventors of interactive technologies be
able to enforce their patents.20 In addition, commercial actors aware
14. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72,
117 (2012) (arguing that the modem patent infringement analysis is becoming more unmanage-
able and complex, and the issue of joint or divided infringement is an example of this trend); see
also W. Keith Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement,
62 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 109–112, 115 (2012) (arguing for determining if there should be divided
infringement liability based on whether multi-party interaction was an innovative concept of the
patent). But see Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255,
272–73 (2005) (explaining that claims can be drafted to capture the activity of a single entity and
avoid the divided infringement complications that arise when a claim requires the actions of
more than one party).
15. See Brief of CTIA—the Wireless Association® and MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Defendant-Cross Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, Akamai Tech.,
Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 06-CV-11109, 06-CV-
11585), 2011 WL 4071472 at 3–4 [hereinafter Wireless Association Brief] (“Advances in wireless
technology have enabled explosive innovation in the last decade. Ten years ago, consumers used
cell phones almost exclusively to make voice calls. Five years later, they were texting, sharing
pictures, and surfing the Internet.”).
16. Id. at 8 (stating that 234 million or more Americans use mobile devices).
17. Id. at 4.
18. Mansoor Iqbal, App Revenue Statistics, BUSINESS OF APPS (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www
.businessofapps.com/data/app-revenues/#1.
19. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Financial Services Roundtable in Support of Limelight Net-
works, Inc. and Affirmance at 4, Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 7730148 [hereinaf-
ter Financial Services Brief].
20. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1281, 1285–86 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority’s decision removed all interactive
methods from patent eligibility), sub nom. Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.
(Akamai/McKesson), 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 572 U.S. 915
(2014).
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of an interactive patent’s claims should be able to understand how to
avoid infringing that patent.
If a party “uses” a patented invention without authorization, they
infringe the patent under § 271(a) of the Patent Act.21 The Supreme
Court has held that a “use” right means the right to put into service
any given invention.22 Generally, liability for use of an invention also
attaches if the invention is used for a purpose that was not envisioned
by the patentee.23 While the Federal Circuit purports to follow these
general principles, it has struggled with how to interpret the use of
interactive inventions since at least the early 2000s.
For example, divided infringement deals with the question of
whether there can be infringement liability when the performance of
an interactive method claim is split among multiple parties, actors, or
devices.24 The current rule, recently articulated by the Federal Circuit,
is that there may be infringement liability when the steps of a method
are performed by multiple parties if a single defendant “exercises
‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every step is
attributable to the controlling party.”25 There may also be liability
“when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or
receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented
method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.”26
Finally, an entity may be liable where actors form a joint enterprise.27
The current test for divided infringement represents a significant
shift in the law from just ten years ago. In 2007, liability for divided
infringement required a showing that one party directed or controlled
another to perform the infringed method.28 The direction and control
test was an incredibly high bar to meet. Commentators viewed the test
as a “loophole” for infringement.29 Judge Pauline Newman famously
21. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM OF PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABIL-
ITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.02(4)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2019) (explaining that use is a
discrete act of infringement); see 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
22. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 11 (1913).
23. CHISUM, supra note 21, § 16.02(4)(c) (“One does not escape infringement by using a pat-
ented invention for a purpose not contemplated or disclosed by the patentee.”)
24. See id. § 16.02(6)(a).
25. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC
Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, LP, 498 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
26. Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai IV), 797 F.3d 1020, 1023
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
27. Id.
28. See BMC Res., Inc, v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
29. See Long Truong, After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: Conspiratorial Infringe-
ment as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1897, 1918–19 (2009)
(arguing that a legal loophole encourages actors to avoid infringement by entering into conspira-
cies to avoid liability).
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lamented that interactive patents were not patents at all because they
could not be enforced under the direction or control test.30
Several recent cases indicate that the Federal Circuit has settled on
a broader approach to infringement of interactive method claims.31
Recently, it has turned its attention to infringement of interactive sys-
tem claims.32 While the Federal Circuit seems to have broadened the
test for determining when an interactive method has been used by one
or more parties, the recent cases on use of interactive systems seem to
be moving in the opposite direction.33 This trend is problematic for
emerging technologies that will use a system of connected devices to
perform simple and complex processes.34
For example, to determine what it means to use an interactive sys-
tem requires interpreting a number of bespoke judicial rules. Gener-
ally, to use an invention means to put that invention into service.35
However, courts have further interpreted the meaning of “use” based
on the location of the use and what entity is in possession of particular
system components.36 A system invention is used in the place where it
is put into service and beneficial use of the system is obtained.37 When
elements of a system are in the possession of more than one actor, a
party uses the system when it controls the system as a whole and ob-
tains a benefit from it.38 Finally, a party may also infringe a claimed
30. See Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting).
31. Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 877 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Paren-
teral Medicines, Inc., 845 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
32. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., 724 F. App’x 942 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
33. Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329; Grecia, 724 F. App’x at 946–47.
34. Michal S. Gal, Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309,
310–11 (2017) (“Intelligent personal assistants, such as Google Assistant, Amazon Alexa, and
Apple’s Siri, perform tasks for individual users, based on users’ inputs (such as scheduling con-
straints) and a variety of online sources (such as weather or traffic conditions). Consumers can
already purchase a washing machine from the W9000 series developed by Samsung and IBM,
which uses IBM’s ADEPT (Autonomous Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Telemetry) technology to
make autonomous orders and payments to restock detergent, for example, and then update the
owner via a smartphone. This technology, revealed in 2015, exemplifies what is known as the
Internet of Things (“IoT”), whereby connected devices automatically handle myriad day-to-day
tasks.”)
35. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1157 (2006).
36. See id. at 1316–18; see generally N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d
1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F. 2d 1070, 1083 (1976).
37. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317 (citing Decca, 544 F.2d at 1083).
38. Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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element that operates in a system environment if the asserted claim
contemplates a single infringer.39
Recently, the Federal Circuit has narrowed its interpretation of
“use.” When elements of a system are in the possession of more than
one actor, infringement of the system occurs only if the accused in-
fringer obtained a benefit from each and every element of the sys-
tem.40 Further, in a non-precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit
suggested that in a situation where an accused infringer does not pos-
sess any elements of a claimed system, but must act to put the system
into service, “the alleged benefit should be tangible, not speculative,
and tethered to the claims.”41
This development is troubling for two main reasons. First, it contin-
ues a trend of the Federal Circuit applying narrow and invention-spe-
cific legal rules.42 District courts have already begun to apply the
beneficial rule test in narrow ways.43 In addition, basing legal tests on
the concepts of location and possession seem futile in the emerging
connected and shared economy.44 Second, the Federal Circuit’s ap-
proach with respect to interactive system claims seems to be at odds
with its recent broadening of the test for determining infringement of
interactive method claims.45 The test for interactive method claims
was broadened, in part, due to a line of cases that made it unlikely
that any interactive method could be enforced.46
39. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That other
parties are necessary to complete the environment in which the claimed element functions does
not necessarily divide the infringement between the necessary parties. For example, a claim that
reads ‘An algorithm incorporating means for receiving e-mails may require two parties to func-
tion, but could nevertheless be infringed by the single party who uses an algorithm that receives
e-mails.’”).
40. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“In an analysis of a system claim under Centillion, proof of an infringing “use” of the
claimed system under § 271(a) requires the patentee to demonstrate that the direct infringer
obtained “benefit” from each and every element of the claimed system.”).
41. Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., 724 F. App’x 942, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
42. Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161,
1163 (2010) (arguing that the Federal Circuit perpetuates judicial nonuniformity).
43. Acceleration Bay LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 470, 483 (D. Del. 2018)
(“The only “benefits” to which Plaintiff points are general financial benefits and vague techno-
logical benefits.”); Rearden LLC v. Walt Disney Co., No. 17-CV-04006-JST, 2018 WL 3031885
(N.D. Cal. June 18, 2018).
44. Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1407 (2016)
(“The sharing economy can be tagged as what’s mine is still mine but you may use it, access it,
and maybe pretend that it is yours for a limited time and under limited conditions.”).
45. Akamai IV, 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
46. BMC Res., Inc, v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by
Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see Muniauction,
Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Golden Hour Data Sys.,
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In the last twenty years, much has been written about interactive
technology. Scholars have focused on how the legal system will treat
these technologies generally.47 In addition, some scholars have fo-
cused on legal decisions involving these technologies.48 Other scholars
have focused on how courts treat method claims differently from sys-
tem claims.49 For example, Professor Timothy Holbrook has argued
that method claims are treated as “exceptional” and has argued for
them to be treated similarly to other inventions.50
This Article contributes to the growing body of literature by ad-
dressing two important points. First, from a technology standpoint, the
line between systems and methods is blurring. In turn, technology is
implemented and used in an entirely different way than it was fifty
years ago. This has given rise to a superclass of interactive inventions.
Second, this Article suggests a framework for addressing enforcement
issues that arise from the use of interactive inventions. The need for a
coherent framework is evidenced by the differences in the tests ap-
plied by the Federal Circuit in its enforcement of interactive system
and method claims. The Federal Circuit has spent a little over a dec-
ade grappling with the question of how to enforce interactive method
claims. This Article suggests that because of the emerging technical
proximity of interactive system and method inventions, a great deal
can be learned from the Federal Circuit’s struggles to arrive at a work-
able test for the divided infringement of method claims.
The ideas explored in this Article are useful in a number of con-
texts. First, for the practitioner, it provides guidance concerning how
to define and claim an interactive invention from the perspective of an
alleged infringer. Second, this Article sketches a liability conduct
model for interactive system and method claims. An immediate use of
Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
47. Corey Field, Copyright, Technology, and Time: Perspectives on “Interactive” As A Term of
Art in Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 49, 50 (2003) (“Technological interactivity
has become one of the most controversial problems facing courts and legislators.”); Burk, supra
note 8, at 1536 (“From arcade to console and computer desktop to interactive multiplayer net-
work, the explosion in computer video games has been spurred by Internet accessibility, whether
for downloading and updating software, tendering payment, or finding and interacting with
other players.”).
48. Karshtedt, supra note 11, at 596; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 11, at 388; Carrier, supra
note 11, at 5 (“The Supreme Court’s Akamai decision offers (at least) four lessons, which ad-
dress: (1) the text of the Patent Act, (2) the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Federal Circuit,
(3) the question of direct infringement, and (4) policy issues presented by congressional
action.”).
49. Holbrook, supra note 11, at 1008 (providing a comprehensive treatment of the unique
status of method claims in the patent landscape).
50. Id. at 1052.
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this model is to understand how interactive method and system claims
will be enforced. A broader use of this model may be to help scholars
understand how the law reacts to advancements in technology. Fi-
nally, this Article suggests a realignment. Specifically, it argues that
the perspective taken by the courts with respect to use of interactive
invention claims is misaligned. Instead of element-by-element benefi-
cial use, the focus should be on control and beneficial use as a whole,
informed by our understanding of how to determine liability when
multiple actors are involved.51 As the lines between interactive sys-
tems and methods blur, the legal test for what it means to infringe
each type of invention should converge. Convergence may lead to
more consistent outcomes across these two technology domains.
Part I of this Article explains what interactive inventions are and
defines the current “use” model for interactive system and method
claims. Part II suggests changes to the “use” models developed in Part
I. These changes acknowledge technological development in the area
of interactive technologies and the need for clear rules that provide
clarity for acquisition and enforcement of interactive technology pat-
ents. Finally, the Article concludes with suggestions for creating a
more coherent liability model for interactive inventions.
In sum, this Article identifies interactive inventions as a superclass
of inventions and proposes a framework for determining how the law
should enforce them. It explains that because of technological ad-
vances, the distinction between interactive system and method claims
has become less clear from a practical standpoint. This suggests that
courts should no longer treat enforcement of patent claims directed to
interactive systems and methods as completely separate doctrinal puz-
zles. Instead, the law can learn from the Federal Circuit’s struggle with
interactive method claims to formulate a better approach for how in-
teractive system claims should be enforced.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERACTIVE INVENTIONS
How does the law determine when an interactive invention is used
and therefore infringed? This part attempts to construct a “use”
model for interactive inventions. Then, it compares and contrasts the
“use” of interactive systems with that of interactive methods. The in-
teractive use model is then placed in a larger context of multi-actor
liability. But first, this part describes some of the technologies that
may be classified as interactive inventions.
51. Id. at 1058 (arguing in favor of the control and beneficial use test).
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A. The Connected World
Interactive technologies are used in a number of industries includ-
ing the Internet, financial services businesses, and companies special-
izing in personalized medicine. In order to provide some practical
context for the following theoretical discussion, this Section briefly de-
scribes some of the major classes of interactive technologies.52
1. Internet-Age Inventions
Internet-age inventions can be characterized as inventions that
make use of the Internet and its associated technologies—they often
involve the participation of multiple parties. Divided infringement has
a significant impact on internet-age inventions. In Akamai/McKesson,
Judge Pauline Newman expressed a preference for formulating a di-
vided infringement test that would allow owners of internet-age inven-
tions to enforce their patents.53 In contrast, some industry amici
feared that too broad a test would unnecessarily put all participants in
an internet transaction at risk.54
Specific applications of internet-age technology include wireless
technology,55 internet retail,56 and financial services.57 The financial
services industry provides banking services to consumers58 who may
buy or sell goods using an internet retailer.59 These industries have
exploded in the last decade.60 Internet retail use continues to grow in
the United States with approximately 192 million users visiting, on av-
erage, over thirteen retail sites per month.61 Financial services work
globally to facilitate an estimated 10,000 transactions per second
quickly and in a secure manner.62
52. This section contains excerpts from: W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided In-
fringement, and Enforcing Interactive Patents, 67 FLORIDA L. REV. 1961 (2015).
53. See Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012)(Newman, J., dissenting)
(“The court should simply acknowledge that a broad, all-purpose single-entity requirement is
flawed, and restore infringement to its status as occurring when all of the claimed steps are
performed, whether by a single entity or more than one entity, whether by direction or control,
or jointly, or in collaboration or interaction.”).
54. Financial Services Brief, supra note 19, at 16.
55. Wireless Association Brief, supra note 15, at 2.
56. Amici Curiae Internet Retailers’ Brief in Support of Defendant/Cross-Appellant’s En
Banc Response Brief at 2, Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 3796786 [hereinafter In-
ternet Retailers Brief].
57. See Financial Services Brief, supra note 19, at 3.
58. Id.
59. See Internet Retailers Brief, supra note 56, at 2.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id.
62. See Financial Services Brief, supra note 19, at 4.
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Growth in demand for financial services and internet retail has been
driven in part by innovation and explosive growth in the wireless in-
dustry.63 The United States has more mobile internet users than any
other country in the world.64 “Apps,” or applications that run on
smart mobile devices, have also contributed to the growth of the wire-
less industry.65 Mobile app sales generated over $70 billion dollars in
revenue in 2018.66
The global economy has become dependent upon this intercon-
nected system of wireless devices, internet storefronts, and financial
services.67 Different companies and different systems must interact to
provide consumers with the services they have come to expect.68 For
example, a credit card transaction can involve six or more partici-
pants.69 Therefore, different companies in different technology areas
may partner to provide connected web services.70 Partnering is more
efficient for these companies and allows them to specialize, which can
result in higher-quality service.71
Due in part to the innovation taking place in this area, internet-age
companies are targets of an increasing number of patent-infringement
lawsuits.72 For example, wireless carriers may be sued based on meth-
ods that make use of their network.73 Internet retailers are also sued
for patent infringement “based in part on the activities of their cus-
tomers in visiting their websites.”74 Because of the interactive and
multi-participant nature of internet-age technology, the issue of di-
63. See Wireless Association Brief, supra note 15, at 3–4 (“Advances in wireless technology
have enabled explosive innovation in the last decade. Ten years ago, consumers used cell phones
almost exclusively to make voice calls. Five years later, they were texting, sharing pictures, and
surfing the Internet.”).
64. Id. at 8 (stating that 234 million or more Americans use mobile devices).
65. Id. at 4.
66. Mansoor Iqbal, App Revenue Statistics, BUSINESS OF APPS (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www
.businessofapps.com/data/app-revenues/#1.
67. Financial Services Brief, supra note 19, at 4.
68. Wireless Association Brief, supra note 15, at 2.
69. Financial Services Brief, supra note 19, at 2.
70. See Wireless Association Brief, supra note 15, at 7 (“A good example is Sprint’s partner-
ship with Google and others to launch the Google Wallet app earlier this spring. This app pro-
vides a ‘wave and pay’ service through which consumers can pay at stores by simply waving their
phones over a scanner. The phones use a near field communications (‘NFC’) chip to communi-
cate with the scanner. The service involved not only Google, but also Samsung (which incorpo-
rated the NFC chip in the phone), credit powerhouses Citi and MasterCard, merchant processing
provider First Data, and Sprint to provide the necessary network connection.”).
71. Id. at 7.
72. Financial Services Brief, supra note 19, at 12.
73. Wireless Association Brief, supra note 15, at 10.
74. Internet Retailers Brief, supra note 56, at 1.
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vided infringement is of deep concern to internet-age industry
stakeholders.
In sum, although the Internet is no longer “new,” internet-age tech-
nology and applications of that technology continue to grow. Stake-
holders in this industry must provide technology and applications that
facilitate communication between multiple participants. Thus, divided
infringement is a concern for this technology area. This is exacerbated
by the fact that stakeholders in this area are the frequent targets of
lawsuits. The next Section summarizes personalized medicine, another
technology area that has seen significant growth and an uptick in legal
activity in recent years.
2. Personalized Medicine
Personalized medicine is a relatively new field and includes a large
number of small companies.75 The stakeholders in personalized
medicine technology include pharmaceutical, biotech, and genetic
companies, institutions, and organizations.76 These groups are also in-
volved in the development of everything from agriculture applications
to therapeutic healthcare products.77
Therapeutic healthcare products rely heavily on diagnostic tests.78
These tests are used to obtain information about a patient’s molecular
and genetic markers79 associated with the risk of disease, the presence
or absence of a disease, what a patient’s response will be to certain
drug therapies, and other conditions.80 Using this information, health-
care providers can provide patient-specific preventive care and treat-
ment regimens that reduce healthcare costs.81
In order to provide these personalized services, the healthcare in-
dustry has become more efficient; in doing so, it has developed inter-
active systems and methods for performing certain processes.82 For
75. See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Myriad Genetics, Inc., in Support of Neither Party
at vii, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-
1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011WL 3281836 [hereinafter Myriad Amicus Brief]
(describing Myriad’s role in the personalized medicine industry).
76. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of Neither
Party at 1, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos.
2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 3101890 [hereinafter Biotechnology In-
dustry Amicus Brief] (describing the role of biotechnology companies).
77. Id. at 1.
78. Myriad Amicus Brief, supra note 75, at 4.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America on Re-
hearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party at 5, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
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example, it may be more efficient for one actor to perform diagnostic
testing and another actor to correlate a marker detected during the
diagnostic test with a disease or drug treatment.83 Similarly, new and
innovative methods for medical treatment or drug delivery may re-
quire the participation of multiple healthcare providers and patients.84
“Interactive” personalized medicine has several real-world applica-
tions. For example, the Prolaris® test diagnoses a prostate tumor and
correlates that diagnostic information with a patient to help health-
care providers decide how to treat prostate cancer.85 Stakeholders in
personalized medicine expect that similar applications—which allow
users to store and manage healthcare data online and allow hospitals,
insurance carriers, and healthcare providers to interact—will continue
to grow.86 Moreover, future treatment and diagnostic methods will
continue to involve multiple actors.87
The doctrine of divided infringement is of particular interest to per-
sonalized medicine because “[t]he steps of biotechnology method pat-
ents are often capable of being practiced by separate entities.”88
Further, it is extremely time-consuming and costly to develop person-
alized medicine applications.89 Generally, the industry can only pro-
tect this large investment by claims covering the diagnostic and
correlation processes of a personalized medicine product.90 Personal-
ized medicine stakeholders continue to develop novel and interactive
methods for diagnosing and treating medical conditions.91 An in-
fringement framework that is adverse to the personalized medicine
industry could render thousands of patents useless and reduce the in-
centive to invest in expensive and time-consuming research.92
3. The Internet of Things
In addition to personalized medicine, the Internet of Things (IoT) is
an emerging field with numerous interactive applications. The IoT is a
Inc., 692 F.3d 1301(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL
3101889 [hereinafter PhRMA Brief].
83. Myriad Amicus Brief, supra note 75, at viii.
84. Biotechnology Industry Amicus Brief, supra note 76, at 8–9.
85. Myriad Amicus Brief, supra note 75, at 6.
86. PhRMA Amicus Brief, supra note 82, at 10.
87. Id. at 11–12.
88. Biotechnology Industry Amicus Brief, supra note 76, at 8.
89. Myriad Amicus Brief, supra note 75, at 8–9.
90. Id. at 1–2.
91. PhRMA Brief, supra note 82, at 2.
92. Id. at 3.
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platform of objects connected via a complex network.93 The IoT has
slowly grown as more smart devices become connected to the
Internet.94
Several IoT technology stakeholders exist. They include, but are not
limited to and: integrated circuit manufacturers, manufacturers of
sensing equipment, network providers, system integrators, and service
providers in addition to customers and users of IoT services.95 What
makes this platform appealing to technology stakeholders is its poten-
tial to facilitate human interaction with smart devices.96 For legal ob-
servers, it is the multi-participant, interactive nature of this new
platform that makes it important for those concerned with divided in-
fringement issues.
Bruce Sterling, a science-fiction writer, popularized the idea of an
IoT.97 His vision predicted that physical objects connected to the In-
ternet would be traceable in space and time.98 In 2010, connected de-
vices outnumbered human beings.99 There were almost two connected
devices for every one person.100 In 2020 there will be an estimated 200
billion connected objects.101 Technologies such as WiFi allow all these
devices to connect and share information.102 Accordingly, Sterling’s
vision is close to becoming a reality.
Generally, the IoT is defined as an “infrastructure of networked
physical objects.”103 This is a paradigm shift from the internet-age
technology described above.104 Particularly, instead of simply facilitat-
ing human interaction, the IoT allows devices to interact with the
physical environment, gather information from that environment, and
share that information with other devices, people, or environments.105
Technologies and equipment—beyond the Internet itself—that pro-
93. Gerd Kortuem et al., Smart Objects as Building Blocks for the Internet of Things, IEEE
INTERNET COMPUTING, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 44, 44.
94. See Bello & Zeadally, supra note 9, at 1172.
95. Peng-fei Fan & Guang-zhao Zhou, Analysis of the Business Model Innovation of the Tech-
nology of Internet of Things in Postal Logistics, 2011 IEEE 532, 532.
96. Kortuem et al., supra note 93, at 50.
97. See generally BRUCE STERLING, THE EPIC STRUGGLE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2014).
98. Kortuem et al., supra note 93, at 48.
99. See Bello & Zeadally, supra note 9, at 1172.
100. See id. (“By 2010, the number of devices connected to the Internet rose to 12.5 billion,
while the world’s population increased to 6.8 billion . . . .”).
101. A Guide to the Internet of Things, INTEL (last visited on Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.intel
.com/content/www/us/en/internet-of-things/infographics/guide-to-iot.html.
102. Bello & Zeadally, supra note 9, at 1172.
103. Kortuem et al., supra note 93, at 44.
104. See Bello & Zeadally, supra note 9, at 1173 (“Akin to how humans are the users of the
Internet, devices (things) are the users of the IoT.”).
105. Id. at 1172.
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vide the platform for the IoT includes smart objects, information
processing equipment, and device sensing equipment.106
The Internet has allowed people and things to become intercon-
nected. The true power of the IoT is allowing smart objects to interact
and collaborate with each other.107 In other words, “devices are the
users of the IoT network.”108
Because of its possible application in many daily activities, the IoT
is a tremendous growth area for innovation. New and innovative rout-
ing protocols are needed to allow smart objects to communicate in
real time.109 Improvements need to be made in device-to-device com-
munication.110 Further, there is an opportunity to create business
models and business methods that will make use of the IoT platform
in new and innovative ways.111 In sum, with the proliferation of con-
nected devices, the IoT will affect every person from every walk of
life.112
Stakeholders in IoT technology will most likely seek patents for
their inventions. Thus, a coherent infringement framework should be
a primary concern to patentees because of the interactive and collabo-
rative nature of IoT.
B. A “Use” Model for Interactive Inventions
This section attempts to develop a model of “infringement by use”
for interactive inventions. The model provides context for the doctri-
nal problem this Article identifies and attempts to solve. First, this
section discusses how “use” of an invention is defined for both inter-
active methods and systems. Then, this section attempts to synthesize
these separate “use” doctrines into a coherent “use” model for inter-
active inventions. Unfortunately, this section concludes that such an
effort proves to be futile.
106. See Fan & Zhou, supra note 95, at 532 (“The Internet of Things which bases on the
Internet, uses a variety of information sensing identification device and information processing
equipment, such as RFID, GPS, GIS, JIT, EDI, and other devices to combine with the Internet
to form an extensive network in order to achieve information and intelligence for Entity.”).
107. Kortuem et al., supra note 93, at 49.
108. Bello & Zeadally, supra note 9, at 1173.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1173–74.
111. See, e.g., Fan & Zhou, supra note 95, at 535–36 (explaining that business models are
needed to maximize the potential of the IoT in China).
112. Id. at 532.
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1. “Use” of Inventions
Before discussing this Article’s efforts in setting forth a coherent
model of “use,” it must describe what it means to “use” an invention
generally. Direct infringement of a patented system occurs when a
party “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any pat-
ented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent . . . .”113
Unauthorized use of an invention, by itself, is an act of
infringement.114
Use is defined broadly as an act that puts a given invention into
service.115 This may include a “use” that is not intended or contem-
plated by the patentee.116 Under certain circumstances, even a dem-
onstration may constitute use of a claimed invention.117 In contrast,
mere possession of an invention is not use.118 In sum, almost any non-
passive activity is likely to qualify as use of an invention.
2. “Use” of Interactive Inventions
The law concerning use appears to be straightforward until one con-
siders interactive inventions. Interactive inventions, broadly defined,
are inventions that require interaction between more than one
claimed components or the performance of claimed method steps by
more than one actor. Interactive inventions have become more promi-
nent in the last several decades with the advancement of the Internet
and other connective technologies. Courts, in particular the Federal
Circuit, have interpreted the law and created doctrines to explain how
interactive inventions should be enforced. In particular, the Federal
Circuit has spent a great deal of effort defining when an interactive
method is used and therefore infringed.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
114. See CHISUM, supra note 21, § 16.02 (“In listing ‘using’ as one of the patentee’s basic
rights, both Section 154(a)(1) and 271(a) use the disjunctive ‘or.’ 2 This codifies the long-stand-
ing rule that the use of a patented product without making or selling it will constitute
infringement.”)
115. See Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 11 (1913) (“The right to use is a comprehen-
sive term and embraces within its meaning ‘the’ right to put into service any given invention.”);
see also NTP, Inc. v. Res. in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1157 (2006).
116. Zinn v. Weiss, 7 F. 914, 915–16 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1881).
117. CHISUM, supra note 21, § 16.02.
118. Beidler v. Photostat Corp., 10 F. Supp. 628, 635 (W.D. N.Y. 1935), aff’d, 81 F.2d 1015 (2d
Cir. 1936); see also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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a. “Use” of Interactive Methods119
In the last decade, the Federal Circuit has developed doctrines to
address issues concerning inventions to interactive methods. One in-
teresting point about this issue is that it affects the high-tech sector as
well as the personalized medicine sector. Interactive methods as de-
fined in this Article, are inventive methods that are performed by
more than one actor. Enforcing claimed methods that either require
more than one party, or are capable of being performed by one party,
give rise to divided infringement problems. At the time of the writing
of this Article, one could argue that after several years of fluctuation
in the law, the Federal Circuit has arrived at a stable test for determin-
ing when an interactive method claim is infringed. It remains to be
seen whether such a test will endure.
In interactive technologies, a scenario may arise where the activities
of more than one party are involved in possibly infringing a patent.
Third-party liability for patent infringement is addressed under the
patent statute’s inducement and contributory infringement provi-
sions.120 However, another highly controversial doctrine referred to as
divided infringement may also apply.121
Divided infringement deals with the question of whether there can
be infringement liability when the performance of steps of a method
claim is split among multiple actors.122 The current rule states that
there may be infringement liability when the steps of a method are
performed by multiple actors if a single defendant “exercises ‘control
or direction’ over the entire process such that every step is attributa-
ble to the controlling party.”123 There may also be liability when an
alleged infringer “conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a
benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and
establishes the manner or timing of that performance.”124 Finally, an
entity may be liable where actors form a joint enterprise.125
The current test for divided infringement represents a significant
shift in the law from just over ten years ago. In 2007, liability for di-
119. This section contains excerpts from W. Keith Robinson, Emerging Technologies
Challenging Current Legal Paradigms, 19 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 355 (2018).
120. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2012).
121. See Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the doctrinal difficulties that arise when the acts of more than one party alleg-
edly combine to infringe a method claim).
122. See id.
123. Muniauction Inc. v. Thomson Corp, 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC
Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, LP, 498 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
124. Akamai IV, 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
125. Id.
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vided infringement required a showing that one party directed or con-
trolled another to perform the infringed method.126 This “direction or
control” test proved difficult to satisfy. Commentators viewed the test
as a “loophole” for infringement.127 Judge Newman famously la-
mented that interactive patents were unenforceable under the “direc-
tion or control” test.128
Two factors likely contributed to the court’s evolution. First, inter-
active technology has become increasingly prevalent. Second, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) patent quality
initiatives have influenced the Federal Circuit to expand the enforce-
ment capability of valid interactive patents. 129 Currently, the
USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) conducts hearings
for reviewing and challenging granted patents on a number of
grounds.130 For example, inter partes review (IPR) is a proceeding for
reviewing the patentability of one or more claims on novelty or non-
obviousness grounds.131 The post grant review (PGR) proceeding re-
views the patentability of one or more claims of a granted patent on
any ground of patentability, including eligibility under § 101 and
whether the claims comply with the written description and enable-
ment requirements.132 Finally, the transitional program for covered
business method patents (CBM) is a proceeding for reviewing the pat-
entability of one or more claims in a business method patent.133
In combination with the Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank Interna-
tional decision, the threat of PTAB proceedings may have caused the
quality of asserted interactive patents to rise.134 Recent statistics sug-
126. See BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1381.
127. See Long Truong, After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: Conspiratorial In-
fringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1897, 1918–19
(2009) (arguing that a legal loophole encourages actors to avoid infringement by entering into
conspiracies to avoid liability).
128. See Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting).
129. Patent Process Overview, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Nov. 11,
2014), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-process-overview#step2.
130. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar.
20, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patenttrialandappealboard.
131. Inter Partes Review, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 17, 2014),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-
review.
132. Post Grant Review, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 17, 2014),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/post-grant-
review.
133. Business Methods, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (May 29, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/utility-pat-
ent/patent-business.html.
134. See 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014) (concluding that method claims requiring generic computer
implementation did not transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention).
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gest that PGR and CBM petitions challenging patent claims on patent
eligibility grounds have a high likelihood of being granted.135 Few, if
any, claims challenged on patent eligibility grounds have survived
CBM review.136
In sum, the law concerning enforcement of interactive claims has
changed rapidly over the last decade. Patentees of IoT inventions face
a higher bar of patentability. However, valid interactive patents are
now more likely to be found infringed because of the Federal Circuit’s
expansion of the divided infringement doctrine.
Two observations contribute to the “use” model for interactive
method inventions. First, it appears that the current test for divided
infringement of method claims addresses both situations where claims
are written to be infringed by more than one party and where claims
are directed to a single infringer but can be performed by more than
one party. In other words, the “use” model for interactive method
claims focuses less on the intended use of the claimed method and
more on whether all the claimed steps were performed by one or
more parties. Second, the “use” model relies on the relationship be-
tween the parties to determine liability.
In determining the relationship between two or more parties, the
Federal Circuit has established several criteria for determining when
such a relationship might give rise to liability for direct infringe-
ment.137 For example, a joint enterprise may occur where “there is (1)
an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group;
(2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a commu-
nity of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and
(4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which
gives an equal right of control.”138 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
has identified disfavored conduct and relationships that will give rise
to liability when an interactive method claim is infringed. The next
Section explores the law concerning use of system inventions and de-
fines a framework for how infringement by use of system inventions is
defined.
135. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OF-
FICE (Mar. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AIA%20Statistics_March
2017.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Linn, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (1965)).
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b. “Use” of Interactive Systems
Similar to interactive methods, much of the development in the law
regarding interactive systems has involved technology that emerged
after the Internet Age. This Section attempts to define a “use” model
for interactive systems. In order to develop this model, this Section
first describes the history of system inventions. It then examines how
the courts have enforced interactive system inventions. This Section
concludes by defining a model for use of interactive systems.
A system is a type of apparatus.139 An apparatus is synonymous
with a machine.140 Thus, a system is a type of machine, i.e., a combina-
tion of tangible elements or components that work in concert to carry
out a particular function.141 One difference between a system and a
machine is that a system’s components can exist in different loca-
tions.142 The Federal Circuit has held that a system is used where “the
system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the place where control of
the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained.”143
An interactive system is a system that is capable of being used by
more than one actor. This may include (1) a system that requires mul-
tiple actors to function144 or (2) a system where one or more compo-
nents of the claimed system are not in the possession of the same
actor.145
Similar to interactive method claims, interactive system claims in-
voke the divided infringement problem.146 Courts have acknowledged
that one way patentees can avoid divided infringement issues is to
draft claims directed to a single actor.147 In cases where the claims are
139. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 762 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (discussing claims directed to a seis-
mic processing system); see also Ex parte Fressola, 27 [U.S.P.Q.2d] 1608, 1611 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Int’f 1993) (“A ‘system’ is an ‘apparatus.’”).
140. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABIL-
ITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.02 (LexisNexis 2019).
141. In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 762 n.2 (explaining that the system claim at issue was identical in
substance to a method claim included in the same patent); see also NTP, Inc. v. Res. in Motion,
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006) (explaining that the
components of a system are used collectively).
142. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317.
143. Id.
144. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
145. Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
146. See CHISUM, supra note 21, § 16.02 (6)(a)(iii).
147. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1309 (“That other parties are necessary to complete the environment
in which the claimed element functions does not necessarily divide the infringement between the
necessary parties. For example, a claim that reads ‘An algorithm incorporating means for receiv-
ing e-mails’ may require two parties to function, but could nevertheless be infringed by the single
party who uses an algorithm that receives e-mails.”).
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not drafted in this manner, the Federal Circuit has crafted a series of
bespoke judicial rules to address varying factual scenarios.
As mentioned above, a unique characteristic of systems is that the
components can operate in different locations. In NTP, Inc. v. Re-
search In Motion, Ltd., the Federal Circuit had to determine where a
claimed system was used when part of the accused system was located
in a foreign country.148 The court found that a claimed system is used
in the place where it is put into service and beneficial use of the sys-
tem is obtained.149
Another factual issue may arise when the alleged infringer pos-
sesses one component of a multi-component system. For example, in
Centillion Data Systems, LLC v. Qwest Communications Intern., Inc.,
the patent at issue concerned a system that allowed telephone compa-
nies to deliver billing information to users.150 The information was
formatted so that the users could access that information via a per-
sonal computer.151 The Federal Circuit found that where an alleged
infringer possesses one part of a multi-part system, that system is in-
fringed by an actor that puts the invention into service, controls the
system, and receives a benefit from its operation.152 However, the
court also explained that an infringer did not have to have control
over all the elements of a system in order to use the system.153 Under
this factual scenario, the Federal Circuit has recently narrowed its in-
terpretation of use. Now when elements of a system are in the posses-
sion of more than one actor, infringement of the system occurs only if
the accused infringer obtained a benefit from each and every element
of the system.154
A third factual scenario that helps define the use model for interac-
tive inventions is where the alleged infringer does not possess any part
of the accused system but must act to put it into service. In a non-
precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit suggested that in a situation
where an accused infringer does not possess any elements of a claimed
148. 418 F.3d 1282, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
149. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317.
150. 631 F.3d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
151. Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1281.
152. Id. at 1285.
153. Tech. Patents LLC v. T-Mobile UK, Ltd., 700 F.3d 482, 501 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
154. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“In an analysis of a system claim under Centillion, proof of an infringing ‘use’ of the
claimed system under § 271(a) requires the patentee to demonstrate that the direct infringer
obtained ‘benefit’ from each and every element of the claimed system.”).
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system but must act to put the system into service, “the alleged benefit
should be tangible, not speculative, and tethered to the claims.”155
Based on the foregoing examples, we can develop a model for use
of an interactive system claim that rises to the level of infringement.
Interactive systems contemplate that each component will not be in
the possession of the same actor. In addition, interactive systems con-
template that the system will require more than one actor to put into
operation. The ultimate determinant of infringement of an interactive
system claim appears to be whether the alleged infringer obtains a
benefit from the system. Recent cases suggest that that benefit must
be linked to each component of the system and be tangible.156
c. An Incoherent “Use” Model for Interactive Inventions
This section briefly compares the “use” models the Article has thus
far developed for interactive system and method claims. This section
illustrates that the “use” models for interactive system and method
claims are misaligned. Next, it discusses what implications we might
draw from this misalignment. This section concludes that while differ-
ing doctrines for method and system claims is a logical result, the con-
vergence of method and system claims due to interactive technologies
makes this disparate treatment more problematic for inventions di-
rected toward emerging technologies, such as the IoT.
Before reaching that conclusion, this Section must first explain the
misalignment. Under the recently-minted Akamai framework, to de-
termine when an interactive method claim is directly infringed, a
threshold issue is whether each element of the asserted method claim
is performed.157 Next, the court looks at the multiple parties involved
and determines liability based in part on the relationship between the
alleged direct infringer and other actors.158 If that relationship be-
tween them gives rise to liability under one of the established tests,
then the accused infringer is liable for direct infringement. Several
types of relationships may give rise to liability, including an agency
relationship or a joint enterprise.159 Thus, the law examines the collec-
tive conduct of all actors and then examines the relationship between
them.
In contrast, the test for determining use of interactive systems is less
concerned with the relationship between the actors required to use
155. Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., 724 F. App’x 942, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
156. Id.
157. See Akamai IV, 797 F.3d 1020, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1023.
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the system. Instead, the court’s analysis focuses on the accused in-
fringer.160 In doing so, the Federal Circuit explained that the accused
infringer will only be liable for direct infringement if they used each
and every component of the system and received a benefit from each
and every component.161 Thus, in contrast to the test for interactive
method claims, the test for interactive system claims focuses only on
the accused infringer.
As evidenced from the discussion above, the test for determining
infringement liability when an interactive system is used by multiple
actors is different from the test used for interactive method claims.
Why might this be a problem and why should we care? In interactive
method cases, a key focus is on the relationships between the alleged
direct infringer(s). In interactive system cases, the court seems uncon-
cerned with the relationships between actors that resulted in the of-
fending conduct. This misalignment flows from the nature of the
inventions and our understanding that system and method claims are
treated differently.162 However, the misalignment in the tests reveals a
problem the courts will undoubtedly have to deal with in the future.
Interactivity is the future. The IoT is an example of emerging inter-
active technology that will blur the line between systems and methods.
This Article does not argue that the tests should be consistent or the
same. Instead, it argues first that the jurisprudence on the use of inter-
active system claims can be informed by the Federal Circuit’s ten-year
experience with divided infringement litigation. Note that “informed”
does not necessarily mean “followed.” Instead, this Article suggests
that some useful insights from the divided infringement problem can
be applied to the use of interactive systems. Second, this Article sug-
gests that both tests for use of interactive system and method claims
should evolve around a set of predictable principles.
This section described a use model for interactive inventions. Spe-
cifically, it defined a use model for both interactive method and sys-
tem inventions. This section then explained how the use models for
infringement of interactive methods and systems are different. Finally,
Section A explained reasons why the use models might be different
and suggested a path forward that may lead to more coherency be-
tween the two models. Next, in an attempt to arrive at more coher-
ency between the two models, Section C discusses the tort origins of
secondary liability. This brief detour will provide the reader with the
necessary tools for supporting this Article’s argument for a more uni-
160. Centillion, 631 F.3d 1279 at 1285.
161. Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329.
162. Holbrook, supra note 11, at 1003.
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form approach to enforcement of interactive patents against multiple
actors.
C. Principles of Multi-Party Liability
In resolving infringement issues, patent law often draws upon tort
law.163 A guiding principle is that a plaintiff will not be barred from
recovery because of the acts of a third party.164
For example, in crafting its divided infringement doctrine, the Fed-
eral Circuit relied on principles of vicarious liability. Specifically, in
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp, the court held that a party that
partly performs steps of a claimed method may be liable for direct
infringement if it would be vicariously liable for the actions of one or
more parties that completed the steps of the claimed method.165
The dissent in Akamai/McKesson proposed an alternative approach
that nevertheless found its roots in tort law. According to Judge New-
man’s proposed test, one or more parties infringe a method claim if all
its steps are performed.166 After having determined that there was in-
fringement, Judge Newman proposed that liability for infringement by
multiple parties should be assessed using tort principles of apportion-
ment.167 The apportionment calculus would consider factors such as
an entity’s relative contribution to the injury, the economic benefit
received by the infringer, and the knowledge or culpability of the con-
tributory infringer.168
This Section briefly summarizes how tort law concepts influenced
the development of common law contributory infringement. Common
law contributory infringement provided the earliest framework for
dealing with multi-actor liability problems. Before the Patent Act of
1952, courts categorized patent infringement as (1) direct infringe-
ment or (2) contributory infringement under a theory of joint
163. Ted Sichelman, Patent Law Revisionism at the Supreme Court?, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 307,
313 (2013) (“Drawing on principles from the common law of torts, the court found that the
defendants ‘have done this for the express purpose of assisting, and making profit by assisting, in
a gross infringement of the complainants’ patent.’”).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 485 (1979).
165. 532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, LP, 498
F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
166. Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The
court should acknowledge that an all-purpose single-entity requirement is flawed, and restore
direct infringement to its status as occurring when all of the claimed steps are conducted,
whether by a single entity or in interaction or collaboration.”).
167. Id. at 1331.
168. Id. (“Remedy for infringement may be apportioned on such traditional tort factors as the
relative contribution to the injury to the patentee, the economic benefit received by the
tortfeasor, and the knowledge and culpability of the actor.”).
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tortfeasance.169 What are now known as inducement and contributory
infringement were conceptualized as just contributory infringe-
ment.170 Under this early formulation of contributory infringement,
“one who intentionally caused, or aided and abetted, the commission
of a tort by another was jointly and severally liable with the primary
tortfeasor.”171 As illustrated below, factors that assisted early courts in
determining whether there was contributory infringement were con-
certed action, intent, and the nature of the relationship between the
parties.
1. The Relationship between the Parties
As early as 1824, the Supreme Court recognized that the relation-
ship between alleged joint tortfeasors was a factor in determining in-
fringement liability.172 In Keplinger v. De Young, the Supreme Court
agreed with a lower court instruction that there could be no infringe-
ment if the defendant had no other connection with a user of the pat-
ented machine than a purchase contract.173 However, the Court
acknowledged the possibility that there might be liability if there was
evidence of more of a connection than the purchase contract or if the
parties involved were attempting to evade the law.174 Thus, in addition
to the relationship between relevant actors, an inquiry as to whether
the parties were attempting to evade the law suggests that the Su-
preme Court would consider other factors related to how or why in-
fringement occurred.175
2. Concerted Action
Before the Patent Act of 1952, most courts adhered to the principal
that (1) whoever uses a patent without permission is an infringer and
(2) whoever contributes to such use is an infringer.176 Wallace v.
Holmes is a notable case that applies common law principles of joint
tortfeasance in the context of patent infringement.177 The plaintiff in
Wallace alleged that the defendant infringed a patent for an improve-
169. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
170. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 761 (2011) (“Before 1952, both
the conduct now covered by § 271(b) (induced infringement) and the conduct now addressed by
§ 271(c) (sale of a component of a patented invention) were viewed as falling within the over-
arching concept of ‘contributory infringement.’”).
171. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
172. See Keplinger v. De Young, 23 U.S. 358 (1825).
173. Id. at 363.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See CHISUM, supra note 21, § 17.02.
177. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871); see also id.
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ment of a lamp.178 The patent claimed a burner and a chimney that
were combined to form the improved lamp.179 The defendants as-
serted that they did not infringe any of the claims of the patent on the
grounds that they only made and sold some of the parts of the lamp.180
Specifically, the defendants manufactured the lamp burner and left it
to purchasers of the burner to supply the chimney.181 The defendants
argued, “where a patent is for a combination merely, it is not infringed
by one who uses one or more of the parts, but not all, to produce the
same results, either by themselves, or by the aid of other devices.”182
The court acknowledged that the rule articulated by the defendant
was well settled.183 However, the court rejected application of the rule
to the facts at issue.184 Instead, the court stated that if, in concert, the
defendant made the burner and a third party provided the chimney
then they must be deemed joint infringers.185 The court noted that
while there was no evidence that the defendants prearranged with a
third party to combine its burner with a chimney, every sale of the
burner made by the defendant was a proposal to the purchaser to sup-
ply the chimney.186 In turn, the purchaser, by purchasing the burner,
consented to supplying or causing the chimney to be supplied to the
burner.187 Thus, based solely on their actions, the court concluded that
the manufacturer of the burner and the customer purchasing the
burner for combination with a chimney were “active parties to the
whole infringement.”188
3. Intent
Alternatively, in other early contributory infringement cases, courts
considered the intent of the relevant actors.189 Generally, these cases
concerned the sale of generic components for use in a patented arti-
cle.190 One early case dealing with contributory infringement, Henry v.
A.B. Dick Co., held that there must be some intent (inferred or other-
178. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 77 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
179. Id. at 78–79.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 79–80.
182. Id. at 80.
183. Id.
184. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1912).
190. Id.; see CHISUM, supra note 21, § 17.02; Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass
Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th Cir. Ohio 1897).
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wise) on the part of a seller to have the sold article used in an infring-
ing way.191 Subsequent cases found no liability where a component
sold by an alleged infringer had other uses in addition to being used in
a patented combination.192
However, this principle was limited by the court in Thomson-Hous-
ton Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co.193 There, the court stated that liabil-
ity could be found if the plaintiff could affirmatively show that the
defendant seller intended to assist in the infringement.194 The court
said that intent could be shown by knowledge or indifference by the
defendant as to the consequences of its act.195 Subsequent decisions
found contributory infringement where the sale of components was
accompanied by active inducement in the form of instructions, adver-
tising, or other steps indicating intent by the defendant that the com-
ponent be used in an infringing fashion.196
In sum, early courts considered the actions of the parties, intent of
the parties, and the nature of the relationship between the parties as
factors in determining whether more than one party infringed a pat-
ent. Congress codified the common law in the Patent Act of 1952.197
While some of the general principles established by the courts re-
mained, Congress narrowed their application to specific situations.198
D. Summary
This part began by describing examples of interactive technology.
Many interactive inventions are directed to emerging industries such
as the IoT and personalized medicine. These technologies represent
huge growth opportunities for existing companies as well as fertile
ground for new startups.
This part then attempted to define a “use” model for interactive
inventions. The model describes how the law determines when a claim
to an interactive invention is infringed by use. Then, it compared and
contrasted “use” of interactive systems with that of interactive meth-
ods. The interactive “use” model was then placed in a larger context
of multi-actor liability.
191. See Henry, 224 U.S. at 17; CHISUM, supra note 21, § 17.02; Thomson-Houston, 80 F. Cas.
at 723.
192. See CHISUM, supra note 21, § 17.02.
193. Thomson-Houston, 80 F. Cas. at 723.
194. Id.
195. See Thomson-Houston, 72 F. Cas. at 1018.
196. See CHISUM, supra note 21, § 17.02.
197. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
198. See id. § 271 (b)–(c) including the words “knowingly” and “actively.”
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This Part observed that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “use”
of an interactive system is problematic. This problem is caused by the
court’s attempt to apply an outmoded framework to interactive inven-
tions. Part II further explores this tension and suggests a more consis-
tent approach for defining use of a distributed system invention.
Inconsistency in how interactive inventions will be enforced could, in
part, stifle these burgeoning industries.
II. ENFORCING INTERACTIVE INVENTIONS
As identified in this Article above, interactive inventions are sys-
tems or methods that are capable of being infringed by one or more
actors. Part I defined the current infringement framework for interac-
tive inventions. This framework is ill-suited to deal with these particu-
lar types of inventions. Specifically, requiring that an alleged infringer
benefit from each element of a system claim severely weakens system
patents.
The goal of Part II is to suggest a more coherent approach for ana-
lyzing multi-actor infringement liability of interactive system inven-
tions. In order to do this, Part II first argues for a shift in perspective.
That is, it is time to view interactive inventions as different and apart
from traditional method or system inventions. Similar to interactive
method claims, interactive system claims present unique challenges to
courts given the statutory infringement framework. Despite present-
ing similar problems for multi-actor infringement, current jurispru-
dence narrowing enforcement opportunities for interactive system
patents is at odds with the broadening of enforcement parameters for
interactive method claims.
Second, Part II proposes a framework for treating problems that
arise from multi-actor liability in a manner that balances the notice
function of patents with the ability to enforce interactive inventions.
The proposed framework, informed by the Federal Circuit’s last dec-
ade of divided infringement decisions, relies on traditional principles
for multi-actor liability. As a result, Part II argues that a direct in-
fringer uses a system when it controls the system and obtains a benefit
from it. Further, both the “use” and “benefit” requirements should be
evaluated under existing principles for multi-actor liability. This ap-
proach is more consistent with the Federal Circuit’s recent expansion
of the divided infringement doctrine for interactive method claims.
Consistency in the court’s understanding of what it means to use inter-
active methods and systems is valuable because the line between sys-
tem and method claims is blurring.
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A. The Challenge of Interactive Inventions
Interactive inventions exist in a doctrinal void. Interactive system
claims present unique challenges to courts given the statutory in-
fringement framework. Interactive system claims can be used by one
or more users, but the infringement statute contemplates a single
user.199 Third-party liability as defined in the statute does not apply to
multi-party users of an interactive system. The growing number of
cases where the court has to make up new rules is evidence of these
new challenges. This section, provides evidence in support of the
aforementioned reasons.200
Interactive system claims can be used by one or more users but the
infringement statute contemplates a single user. 201 The “single entity”
rule states that direct infringement under § 271(a) requires a showing
that a single party practiced each and every element of the claimed
invention. 202 The “single entity” rule is closely related to the “All-
Limitations” rule and is used in direct infringement determinations.203
One commentator has asserted that the “single entity” or “Single Ac-
tor” rule is a corollary to the “All-Limitations” rule and that the
“whoever” in the language of § 271 “refers to only a single, individual
entity.”204 Thus, under the “single entity” rule, “whoever” refers to
only a single, individual entity for the purposes of direct
infringement.205
199. Id.
200. This section contains excerpts from W. Keith Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Al-
ternative Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59 (2012), and W. Keith Robinson,
Only a Pawn in the Game: Rethinking Induced Patent Infringement, 32 SANTA CLARA H. TECH.
L. J. 1 (2015).
201. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
202. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Infringe-
ment requires, as it always has, a showing that a defendant has practiced each and every element
of the claimed invention.”), overruled by Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
203. See Joshua P. Larsen, Seminar Article, Liability for Divided Performance of Process
Claims After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. L. 41, 49–50 (2008) (examining the importance of the “All Limitations Rule” which de-
fined the scope of a patent by requiring that each step be performed to prove infringement).
204. See id. at 50–51 (arguing that the “single actor” and “All-Limitations” rules act as corol-
laries for direct infringement cases); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, . . . infringes the patent.”); BMC Res.,
498 F.3d at 1378–79 (“Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every
step or element of a claimed method or product. For process patent or method patent claims,
infringement occurs when a party performs all of the steps of the process.”) (internal citations
omitted).
205. Id.
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Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and
every step or element of a claimed method or product.206 Since direct
infringement is a strict liability offense, a showing of intent and/or
knowledge of the patent is not required.207 That is, under direct in-
fringement, independent creation is not a defense and the infringe-
ment may be unintentional and inadvertent.208
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., held that indirect in-
fringement (inducement and contributory infringement) requires a
finding that a party amongst the accused actors has committed the
entire act of direct infringement.209 Further, to succeed in an action
for inducement or contributory infringement, BMC held that a plain-
tiff must first show that direct infringement under § 271(a) has oc-
curred.210 In Akamai II the Federal Circuit overruled the portion of
BMC that applied the “single entity” rule to the determination of in-
fringement based on an inducement theory.211 However, it is impor-
tant to note that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Akamai II seems to
have left the “single entity” rule intact with respect to direct infringe-
ment.212 Accordingly, since the “single entity” rule still applies to di-
rect infringement, it is important to study its origin.
In formulating the “single entity” rule, the court in BMC relied on
language in several cases that was not necessarily applicable to identi-
fying a single infringer.213 For example, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,214 stands for the proposition that the doc-
trine of equivalents, like literal infringement, must be tested element
206. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (requiring
an “objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis”); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770,
773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that merely selling the equipment to perform the step in a process is
insufficient to prove infringement and requiring the infringer to perform the process as well).
207. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (the infringer does not even
have to know of the existence of the patent); see Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 35 (noting that
knowledge may be considered as part of damages but not liability for infringement).
208. See Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) (emphasizing
that independent design elements or modifications may show the infringer intended to avoid
liability), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Blair v. Dowd’s, Inc. 438 F.2d 136, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
209. 498 F.3d at 1378–79.
210. Id.
211. Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
212. Id. (stating that there can be liability for induced infringement where all the steps are not
performed by a single entity).
213. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (evaluating the facts under a
looser standard and coming to the same conclusion), overruled by Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Lime-
light Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
214. 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
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by element.215 Courts have repeatedly held that a process claim is di-
rectly infringed when the process is performed.216 In Dennison Manu-
facturing Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc.,217 the court stated that the
test of infringement is whether the claimed process is utilized by the
infringer.218 Accordingly, none of these cases explicitly state that a
“single entity” must perform each and every step of a claimed method
to be a direct infringer.
Further, in an attempt to weaken the “single entity” rule, one amici
curiae in Akamai II asserted that the word “whoever” in § 271 can
mean more than one person.219 Statutory interpretation may indi-
rectly support this definition. Specifically, “whoever invents” refers to
more than one inventor.220 Further, § 1 of the United States Rules of
Construction states that, “words importing the singular include and
apply to several persons, parties, or things.”221 Accordingly, one could
conclude that the word “whoever” should not be limited to mean a
single entity.222
Despite the “all elements” and “single entity” rules seemingly re-
quiring the identification of a single infringer for direct infringement,
courts have recognized that some form of joint infringement may oc-
cur, and, therefore, joint liability should be assigned. For example, the
court in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty
Co., stated that when patent infringement is brought about by a “con-
215. Id. (“The determination of equivalence should be applied as an objective inquiry on an
element-by-element basis.”).
216. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
see Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The sale of the apparatus in
Standard Havens was not a direct infringement because a method or process claim is directly
infringed only when the process is performed.”); see also Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex
Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a defendant who did not manufacture a
product could not infringe a product-by-process claim).
217. Dennison, 467 F. Supp. at 427.
218. Id. at 427 (“To be a direct infringer of the method claims, defendant must be found to
have used the attachments in question in the manner prescribed in the method claims.”).
219. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America on Re-
hearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1291), 2011 WL 3101831, at *18–19 [hereinafter Amicus
Brief for Neither Party] (arguing that “whoever” in § 271(a) must be able to mean more than
one person).
220. See id. (asserting that 1 U.S.C. § 1 and common dictionary definitions strongly suggest
that “whoever” must have a possible plural interpretation).
221. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
222. Amicus Brief for Neither Party, supra note 219, at 18–19 (“On its face, this statutory
prohibition is directed to ‘whoever’ has engaged in infringing conduct and says nothing about
whether such conduct is to be carried out by a single entity or a group of entities acting in
concert with one another.”). But see Akamai/McKesson, 692 F.3d 1301, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Linn, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of the word “whoever” simply means that more than
one entity can be independently liable for direct patent infringement).
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cert of action,” all parties engaged directly and intentionally are joint
infringers.223 In addition, several courts have recognized that joint lia-
bility may be imposed when infringement is the result of the participa-
tion and combined actions of defendants.224 Moreover, courts have
held that infringement of a patented method cannot be avoided by
defendants that have another party perform a step of the method on
their behalf.225
Third-party liability is defined in the Patent Statute as either in-
ducement or contributory infringement.226 In 1952, Congress defined
how a patent could be indirectly infringed by enacting § 271 (b) and
(c) of the Patent Act. Both sections (b) and (c) codified pre-1952 case
law concerning indirect infringement.227 An important right conferred
with a patent is the capability of enforcing the patent against indirect
infringers.228 The purpose of indirect infringement as a cause of action
“is to provide a remedy for patent holders when it is impossible or
inefficient for them to sue direct infringers, and to deter parties from
engaging in behavior that may result in the infringement of a pat-
ent.”229 For example, in some cases the direct infringer is a purchaser
or user who is judgment proof or a future consumer.230 Therefore, it is
economically and commercially infeasible for the patent owner to sue
this type of consumer for direct infringement.231 However, the party
223. 77 F. 288, 297 (6th Cir. 1896).
224. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125, 1129 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13,
2003) (agreeing that the joint infringer theory is viable under § 271(a)); see McDermott v. Omid
Int’l, 723 F. Supp. 1228, 1236 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that the defendants are jointly liable
when the infringement was the result of the “participation and combined actions of the defend-
ants”), aff’d per curiam sub nom., McDermott v. Omid Int’l, 883 F.2d 1026, 1026 (6th Cir. 1989).
225. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), aff’d, 667 F.2d 1232
(5th Cir. 1982); see also Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1944) (“It
is obvious that one may infringe a patent if he employ an agent for that purpose or have the
offending articles manufactured for him by an independent contractor.”); Metal Film Co. v. Met-
lon Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 110 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“That defendants choose to have the vac-
uum metallizing, which was a conventional step . . . done by outside suppliers does not mitigate
their infringement of the overall process.”).
226. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2012).
227. CHISUM, supra note 21, § 17.04(3).
228. See Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the Fed-
eral Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED. CIR.
B.J. 299, 300 (2000).
229. Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 1575, 1591 (2011); see also Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 225, 228 (2005) (“The goal of secondary liability is to give patent owners effective pro-
tection in circumstances in which the actual infringer either is not the truly responsible party or
is impractical to sue.”).
230. Odin B. Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARV. L. REV. 35, 39
(1898).
231. See Rader, supra note 228, at 306.
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who encouraged or aided in the direct infringement may be more cul-
pable than the end consumer and direct infringer.232
Because of the nature of a cause of action under indirect infringe-
ment, certain scienter standards must be met by the indirect infringer
to support a finding of liability. The scienter standard codified in the
statute is based on historical precedent.233 While ambiguous on its
face, the Supreme Court has held that liability under both § 271(b)234
and (c)235 require that the accused indirect infringer have had knowl-
edge of the patent.236 Further, commentators and the Supreme Court
have characterized inducement as having an even greater scienter re-
quirement than contributory infringement because liability under
§ 271(b) also requires that the alleged inducer have intended to cause
the infringement.237
As mentioned above, the law characterizes indirectly infringing ac-
tivities as either inducement or contributory infringement.238 Contrib-
utory infringement generally concerns selling or providing a
component that is then used to infringe a patent.239
Contributory infringement is defined in § 271(c) of the Patent
Act.240 In contrast to the inducement statute, § 271(c) defines the con-
duct that could subject an alleged contributory infringer to liability in
detail.241 For example, the statute specifies that the selling or importa-
tion of a component (1) of a patented item or (2) for use in a patented
232. See Lemley, supra note 229, at 226.
233. See Sichelman, supra note 163, at 309 (“[C]ourts have read both indirect infringement
provisions as including scienter thresholds.”).
234. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.”).
235. Id. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or
a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an in-
fringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for sub-
stantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).
236. See Sichelman, supra note 163, at 309–10.
237. See id. at 341; see also Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926–28
(2015) (clarifying that liability for inducement requires proof that the defendant knew her acts
infringed the asserted patent).
238. See Sichelman supra note 163, at 309 (“Contributory infringement and inducement of
infringement fall under the general rubric known as ‘indirect infringement.’”).
239. See Lemley, supra note 229, at 227.
240. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or im-
ports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suita-
ble for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).
241. Id.
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process is contributory infringement if the component constitutes a
material part of the invention and is not a staple article of com-
merce.242 Further, the alleged infringer is required to know that the
component was especially made or adapted for use in infringing the
asserted patent.243
The concept of contributory infringement was fleshed out at com-
mon law well before it was codified in the Patent Act. In Wallace v.
Holmes, a court held, for the first time, that a defendant could be lia-
ble for infringement by supplying a component for use in an infringing
device.244 The patent at issue covered a 19th century lamp which in-
cluded a burner and a chimney. The defendants only made and sold
the burner, which had no other use than to be combined with a chim-
ney.245 Customers purchased the burner and combined it with a chim-
ney, the combination of which infringed the asserted patent.246
While the court stated that simply selling the burner was not in-
fringement, it nevertheless held the defendants liable for aiding and
abetting infringement of the patent.247 One reason the defendants
were found to be liable was because they had the intent to make the
burner so that it would be combined with a component supplied by
consumers.248 However, as one commentator has argued, it is ques-
tionable whether the court in Wallace also required knowledge of the
patent.249
Later courts have fleshed out the scienter requirements for contrib-
utory infringement. Liability for contributory infringement now re-
quires an examination of the alleged contributory infringer’s
knowledge and intent.250 In Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., (Aro II) the Supreme Court determined that for there to be
liability for contributory infringement, the defendant must have
known about the patent and, by their actions, intended to infringe the
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
245. See id. at 79; see also Rader, supra note 228, at 305 (“Contributory infringement was
Congress’s response to the problem of Wallace v. Holmes, in which the intent of the defendant to
infringe is manifest from the fact that the product sold has no substantial non-infringing uses.”).
246. See Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 79–80.
247. See id.; see Rantanen, supra note 229, at 1593.
248. See Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80; Roberts, supra note 230, at 37.
249. See Sichelman, supra note 163, at 313 (“Although the Wallace court’s test might casually
be read to require knowledge of the patent, the court held that scienter turned on the ‘certain
knowledge that such burners are to be used, as they can only be used, by the addition of a
chimney.’”).
250. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir 2006) (“[I]nducement
requires that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent
to encourage another’s infringement.”).
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patent.251 That is, the defendant must have intended to cause the ac-
tual infringement.252
While contributory infringement is designed as an alternative way
in which a patentee can enforce their patent rights, the concept of
contributory infringement does present some interesting challenges.
Most of the technology that is the subject of complex Internet Age
patents had yet to be conceived when both Wallace and Aro II oc-
curred.253 Further, Internet Age technology did not exist in the 1950s
when Congress wrote the statute. Thus, as one commentator has ar-
gued, the statute seems “ill-equipped” to handle modern day
technologies.254
In contrast to contributory infringement, induced infringement is
much broader. It encompasses any behavior where one party encour-
ages or assists another to directly infringe a patent.255 However, as
discussed below, that breadth has led to difficulty in interpreting the
requirements for induced infringement.
Theoretically, any conduct that is not captured by contributory in-
fringement that was actionable before 1952 is now covered by induce-
ment under § 271(b) of the Patent Act.256 Induced infringement
imposes liability on an actor who causes another to directly infringe a
patent.257 Examples of inducement can include providing advice or
instructions that assists in direct infringement, repairing infringing de-
vices, or otherwise controlling another’s infringing activities.258 The
plaintiff must show (1) that the induced conduct constitutes direct in-
fringement and (2) that the defendant had the requisite intent.259 The
requisite intent includes a showing that the defendant had knowledge
251. See 377 U.S. 476, 525 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); see Josh Rychlinski, Interactive Meth-
ods and Collaborative Performance: A New Future for Indirect Infringement, 20 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 221 (2013).
252. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 408 (2005).
253. See Rychlinski, supra note 251, at 241.
254. Id.
255. See Sichelman, supra note 163, at 308–09.
256. Note, Section 271(b) of the Patent Act of 1952: Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J. 132, 139
(1956) [hereinafter Confusion Codified]; see Rantanen, supra note 229, at 1598 (explaining that
271(b) is open-ended language that covers various activities).
257. See Lemley, supra note 229, at 228 (defining induce as causing a person to do something
he would not have done otherwise); Karthick Kumar, Of Deep-Fryers and (Semiconductor)
Chips: Why Ignorance of a Patent is No Excuse for its Indirect Infringement, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 727,
748 (2012) (“In 1952, the term ‘induce’ meant ‘[t]o lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move
by persuasion or influence.’ In the context of the Patent Act, the adverb ‘actively’ suggests ‘the
inducement must involve the taking of affirmative steps to bring about the desired result.’”).
258. Confusion Codified, supra note 256, at 139; see Rantanen, supra note 229, at 1598.
259. See Rader, supra note 228, at 308.
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of the patent or was willfully blind to its existence and intended to
cause the infringement of the patent.260
The primary purpose of inducement is to provide a mechanism for a
patent holder to enforce her patent against third parties that the law
has deemed should be liable for causing infringement of the asserted
patent.261 The broad language of the inducement statute even has the
power to impose liability on the seller of a component with substan-
tially non-infringing uses.262 That is, inducement can be viewed as a
“catchall” provision that captures activities that contributory infringe-
ment does not.263 Further, inducement allows a plaintiff to recover
against someone other than direct infringers that may be difficult to
sue and judgment proof.264
It is well settled that liability for inducement cannot be imposed
without a finding of direct infringement.265 Thus, inducement involves
two actors—an inducer and a direct infringer.266 For example, in
Luten v. Town of Lee, the court stated that direct infringement must
have occurred for there to be inducement.267 In that case, there was
no finding of inducement because actual direct infringement did not
occur.268 One commentator has concluded that inducement is hard to
prove because a plaintiff must show that direct infringement occurred
and, in addition, must show that the defendant had the requisite intent
and knowledge of the patent.269
260. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
261. See Rader, supra note 228, at 306–07.
262. See id. at 305.
263. See Rantanen, supra note 229, at 1596.
264. See Holbrook, supra note 11, at 1017.
265. See, e.g., DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir 2006) (“[T]he
patentee always has the burden to show direct infringement for each instance of indirect in-
fringement.”). See CHISUM, supra note 21, at § 17.04(1) (“In Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai
(2014), the Supreme Court confirmed that a person may not “be liable for inducing infringement
of a patent under 35 U. S. C. § 271(b) when no one has directly infringed the patent under
§ 271(a) or any other statutory provision; liability for inducement under Section 271(b) depends
on a showing that the conduct being induced constitutes direct infringement”); Charles Miller,
Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 86, 102
(1971) (“Liability under 35 U.S.C. 271(b) requires the existence of direct infringement by an-
other party which is actionable under 35 U.S.C. 271(a).”).
266. Erwin Basinski, Some Comments on Contributory and Induced Patent Infringement: Im-
plications for Software Developers, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 777, 778 (1999).
267. See 206 F. 904, 905 (D. Mass. 1913); see also Miller, supra note 265, at 104; Basinski,
supra note 266, at 778 (“It is important to understand that, without ‘direct infringement of the
patent claims there can be neither contributory infringement . . . nor inducement of
infringement.’”).
268. See Miller, supra note 265, at 104 (explaining that direct infringement, existing or
threatened, is a prerequisite to a finding of induced infringement).
269. See Gary N. Frischling & Miriam Bitton, Grokking Grokster: Has the Supreme Court
Changed Inducement Under Patent Law?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 265, 273 (Summer, 2006); see also Con-
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Although the language of the inducement statute is considerably
shorter than that of contributory infringement, several difficult ques-
tions about how the law should interpret § 271(b) exist.270 Section
271(b) is ambiguous and thus has been interpreted both broadly and
narrowly.271 These varying interpretations are an attempt to balance
the idea of deterring infringing conduct against the use of patents to
stifle competition.272
Specifically, there continues to be some debate about what the law
requires regarding the intent and knowledge of the inducer.273 These
issues go to a broader question of how involved the law requires an
inducer to be in the infringement of the asserted patent.274 The Su-
preme Court has held that both inducement and contributory infringe-
ment require that the defendant have knowledge of the asserted
patent.275 Further, a plaintiff must show that the defendant possessed
specific intent to encourage infringement.276 Part of that difficulty has
been that in some instances the law requires an inquiry into the state
of mind of a corporation.277
Given the above doctrinal challenges, the Federal Circuit has strug-
gled in the last decade to craft rules for determining when interactive
inventions are infringed. The next section discusses a recent example
specific to interactive systems.
B. The Misstep of Beneficial Use
This section discusses recent developments concerning the enforce-
ment of interactive inventions. It contends that the Federal Circuit’s
recent decisions unnecessarily constrict the ability for patentees to en-
force interactive system inventions. Specifically, the Federal Circuit’s
fusion Codified, supra note 256, at 140 (“[T]he patentee suing under paragraph (b) must prove
that defendant’s conduct actually culminated in a direct infringement by a third party, and that
defendant intended this result. Even with this guide, however, it will often be difficult, particu-
larly with reference to paragraph (b), to determine whether defendant’s conduct violates the
statute.”).
270. See Lemley, supra note 229, at 226 (“despite the venerable nature of inducement in pat-
ent law, the actual requirements for inducement liability have remained something of a
mystery”).
271. Confusion Codified, supra note 256, at 138; see also Rychlinski, supra note 251, at 220
(“§ 271(b) has been under attack since its very enactment. Some wrote that the section is merely
a nebulous statute which will create difficulties with deciding which activities violate the statute.
Others believed that it would ‘produce new interpretative problems.’”).
272. See Rantanen, supra note 229, at 1591.
273. See Lemley, supra note 229, at 226.
274. See id. at 231.
275. See Global-Tech, 563 U.S. 754; see also Rychlinski, supra note 251, at 228.
276. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
277. See Rantanen, supra note 229, at 1610.
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most recent pronouncement that an alleged infringer must receive a
benefit from each and every component of a system is problematic.278
Further, the requirement that an infringer receive a benefit from each
and every component seems at odds with the Federal Circuit’s charac-
terization of systems—that components are used collectively.279
The requirement that for a system to be infringed, each and every
component of the system must be used, is well established within pat-
ent law doctrine. First, it is well established that use of a patented
invention by itself is infringement.280 Second, the “All Elements” rule
specifies that for a patent claim directed to a machine to be infringed,
each and every element of the claimed invention must be present in
the accused device.281 Similarly, an accused infringer of a method
claim is liable for infringement only if they performed each and every
step of the asserted method claim.282 It follows that for a system pat-
ent to be infringed, each and every component of the claimed system
must be present in the accused system. When the infringing activity is
use, this requirement becomes that each and every element of the
claimed system must be used by an accused infringer.283 In sum, the
use requirement for system patent claims finds sound footing in the
fundamental principles of patent law. Further, the test is clear and
easy to apply. The inquiry is simply whether the accused infringer put
each component of a claimed system into service.284
For system inventions, there also exist an expectation that the use of
a system invention be beneficial.285 In Centillion, the Federal Circuit
held that to infringe a system by use, an accused infringer must use
each and every element of a system and benefit from putting the sys-
278. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“In an analysis of a system claim under Centillion, proof of an infringing ‘use’ of the
claimed system under § 271(a) requires the patentee to demonstrate that the direct infringer
obtained ‘benefit’ from each and every element of the claimed system.”); Grecia v. McDonald’s
Corp., 724 F. App’x 942, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
279. NTP, Inc. v. Res. in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1157 (2006) (explaining that the components of a system are used collectively).
280. CHISUM, supra note 21, § 16.02 (explaining that use of a patented product without mak-
ing or selling it will constitute infringement).
281. Sunrise Med. Hhg v. Airsep Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 348, 441 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (“Under the
‘All Elements’ or ‘All Limitations’ rule, literal infringement requires that each and every ele-
ment of a claim or its substantial equivalent be found in the accused device. Omission of even a
single claimed element precludes a finding of either literal infringement or infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.”).
282. Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (citing NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317).
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (explaining that actual
beneficial use of a system in the U.S. contributed to a finding of infringement liability).
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tem into service.286 In this case, the Federal Circuit did not require
that a receipt of a benefit by the accused infringer be identified for
each component used.287 Instead, the Centillion court’s conception of
beneficial use seems to be based on the idea that a system is used
collectively.288 Accordingly, an early understanding of benefit ac-
quired from use of the system would be a collective benefit, not one
that flows from each and every component of the system.
However, as was observed with the introduction of multi-party in-
fringement in the interactive method context, once this problem is in-
troduced for interactive systems, it seems the Federal Circuit’s first
impulse is to make it more difficult to enforce these types of claims.
Recently, the Federal Circuit has made further modifications to its use
standard for interactive system inventions. In Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, the Federal Circuit interpreted
Centillion and NTP to define use of a system as to control and benefit
from it.289 In addition, the Intellectual Ventures court held that where
components of a system could be used by different actors, an accused
infringer had to make a beneficial use of each and every
component.290
The Intellectual Ventures court made several leaps in defining “use”
with little to no justification. First, the court found that to use a system
a person must control, directly or indirectly, each claimed compo-
nent.291 This pronouncement directly contradicts the Federal Circuit’s
discussion in Centillion, where it rejected a definition of use that re-
quired direct control over each individual element of a system.292 In-
stead, the Centillion court defined “use” of an element as not a matter
of control but instead defined “use” as where the user made each
claimed element “work for their patented purpose.”293 Second, the In-
tellectual Ventures court incorrectly required that the “receipt of a
benefit” requirement applied to each claimed component of a system.
The court did this partly in response to an argument presented by In-
286. Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284.
287. Id.
288. NTP, Inc. v. Res. In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that
use of system components is accomplished collectively, not individually).
289. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (citing Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284; NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317).
290. Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329 (“it follows that, to use a system, a person must
control (even if indirectly) and benefit from each claimed component”).
291. Id.
292. Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“To accept the district court’s interpretation of ‘use’ would effectively overturn NTP be-
cause the predicate “use” in that case would no longer fall under the definition of ‘use.’”).
293. Id.
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tellectual Ventures that an accused infringer must only benefit from
use of the system as a whole.294 The Centillion court only held that to
“use” a system, a party must control the system as a whole and obtain
benefit from it.295 Thus, the language in Centillion requires neither the
coupling of a benefit to each component of a system nor requires a
user to experience a benefit from the system as a whole.
The Federal Circuit’s beneficial use standard as articulated in Intel-
lectual Ventures is unworkable for several reasons. First, benefit is not
clearly defined. Second, it may be easier to show how an accused in-
fringer benefited from a system as a whole and more difficult to deter-
mine the benefit obtained from use of a single component. Third, it is
unclear how the court might evaluate a scenario where an actor uses a
component but does not benefit from that use. For example, perhaps
the benefit is obtained by a third party or the use of the component
causes another component to be put into service that will bestow a
benefit on the user.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s beneficial use test makes it more
difficult to enforce interactive system inventions. This trend seems to
be at odds with the court’s current direction with respect to enforce-
ment of interactive method claims. Professor Timothy Holbrook has
argued that method claims be treated similarly to other claims.296
Therefore, this Article argues that interactive system claims should be
treated in a similar fashion since the court’s jurisprudence is more de-
veloped in the area of interactive method claims. This Article does not
suggest that the court should adopt similar complex rules as it did for
interactive methods. Instead, the principles of multi-actor liability that
undergird the courts development of interactive method claims should
be applied to interactive systems.
In sum, the current test for determining when an interactive system
is infringed by use is misguided. This inconsistency is caused in part by
demarcation between various direct infringement scenarios. If a sys-
tem requires multiple parties to function, a single party may still di-
rectly infringe the claimed system by using the system.297 If the alleged
infringer possesses at least one element of a multi-party system, then
“use” requires that the accused infringer “put the invention into ser-
vice, [i.e.] [sic] control[led] the system as a whole and obtain[ed] a
294. Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329 (“The district court held (and IV argues on appeal)
that Centillion requires only that the infringer benefit from the ‘system as a whole,’ such that a
benefit derived from any claimed component of the claimed system would suffice to demonstrate
an infringing ‘use.’”).
295. Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284.
296. See Holbrook, supra note 11, at 1008.
297. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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benefit from it.”298 However, for a finding of liability, the alleged in-
fringer must do more than just benefit from any element or compo-
nent of the claimed system.299 Instead, “use” of a system occurs if the
alleged infringer benefits from each and every claim element.300 The
benefit must be linked to the claims and be tangible.301
Requiring the beneficial use of each component of a claimed system
is at odds with the definition of a system as the collective use of vari-
ous components. Further, it is unclear what will satisfy the beneficial
use test and whether, in some cases in which use is present, whether a
benefit will also be present. Finally, beneficial use unnecessarily con-
flates the act of use and the question of liability. Thus, this Article
recommends an alternate framework for addressing the enforcement
of interactive system inventions.
C. A Framework for Enforcing Interactive Inventions
Given the shortcomings of the beneficial use test, this section pro-
poses a framework for analyzing infringement of interactive system
claims. The Federal Circuit’s divided infringement decisions provide a
precarious, but nevertheless workable path forward. Over the last dec-
ade the Federal Circuit has struggled with the divided infringement
problem. The court’s current test for divided infringement liability
borrows from principles of multi-actor liability. These sound princi-
ples should also be applied to the problem of determining liability for
infringing interactive system claims. Relying on these principles, this
section explains an approach for determining multi-actor liability in
interactive system claims and suggests how this approach might result
in more consistent enforcement of interactive inventions as a whole.
1. Rethinking “Beneficial” Use
Current jurisprudence narrowing enforcement opportunities for
system patents is at odds with the broadening of enforcement parame-
ters for interactive method claims. Recent Federal Circuit decisions
appear to narrow the opportunities for interactive system inventions
to be enforced against multi-party actors.302 In contrast, over the last
decade, the Federal Circuit has broadened its divided infringement
298. Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
299. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
300. See id.; Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., 724 F. App’x 942 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
301. Grecia, 724 F. App’x at 947.
302. Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329 (“In an analysis of a system claim under Centillion,
proof of an infringing ‘use’ of the claimed system under § 271(a) requires the patentee to
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doctrine, which has resulted in more enforcement opportunities for
patentees of interactive method claims.303 There does not appear to be
a clear reason for the expansion in one area and the narrowing in
another.
The current use model for interactive systems is undesirable. The
beneficial use test is unmoored from established principles for dealing
with multi-actor liability. This leads to inconsistent treatment between
interactive method and system inventions.
In order to remedy this inconsistency, the framework for determin-
ing multi-actor liability for interactive system inventions must be ex-
panded. In order to expand, the court must find a middle ground
between its interpretation of beneficial use in Centillion and Intellec-
tual Ventures.304 That is, liability must attach for something more than
obtaining a benefit from using a system as a whole305 but should not
require that an alleged infringer benefit from each and every element
of an interactive system.306 A middle ground between these two ex-
tremes may provide the court with a more flexible approach.
The proposed framework suggests that for there to be liability for
infringement of an interactive system, the accused infringer must have
used each and every element of the claimed system and benefited
from that use. This approach finds support in both NTP and Centil-
lion.307 Next, where the system is used by multiple actors, the determi-
nation of whether a party’s use and benefit of the interactive system
gives rise to infringement liability should be based on the conduct of
the parties, the nature of their relationships, and intent.
The conduct inquiry examines whether accused infringers have en-
gaged in unauthorized conduct. In the case of interactive system in-
ventions, unauthorized conduct is the use of each and every
component of the claimed system.308 The components of interactive
demonstrate that the direct infringer obtained ‘benefit’ from each and every element of the
claimed system.”).
303. See Grecia, 724 F. App’x at 942 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also BMC Res., Inc, v. Paymentech,
L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Net-
works, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532
F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614
F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
304. See Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); see also Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329.
305. Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284.
306. Intellectual Ventures, 870 F.3d at 1329.
307. NTP, Inc. v. Res. In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
308. Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284 (“We agree that direct infringement by ‘use’ of a system claim
‘requires a party . . . to use each and every . . . element of a claimed [system].’”).
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system claims are used collectively.309 Thus, this Article proposes that
the test for “use” should focus on the collective conduct of the parties
involved. This involves a two-step process. First, did the collective
conduct as a whole result in the use of each and every component of
the claimed system? Second, if each component was used, what were
the circumstances that lead to that use? In other words, what was the
reason that each component was used? To answer this second prong
accurately requires the law to examine the relationships between the
alleged infringers.
When more than one actor uses each and every component of an
invention, the accused infringers’ liability for infringement should de-
pend on whether the acts of one are attributable to the accused in-
fringer, such that a single entity is responsible for the infringement.310
This analysis depends in part on the relationship between the actors.
A relationship between multiple parties that rises to the level of
infringement is defined in the Federal Circuit’s Akamai IV decision.311
There, the court held that “an entity is responsible for others’ per-
formance of method steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that
entity directs or controls the others’ performance, and (2) where the
actors from a joint enterprise.”312 The court defined a joint enterprise
as an arrangement between the parties requiring proof of:
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the
group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a
community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the mem-
bers; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enter-
prise, which gives an equal right of control.313
Both the direction or control and joint enterprise tests are derived
from multi-party tort liability principles.
An alternative approach to the test set forth in Akamai IV may be
to rely on the principle of causal responsibility as suggested by profes-
sor Dmitry Karshtedt.314 This principle suggests that an alleged in-
fringer is responsible for the actions of other parties that they have
caused.315 Here, the inquiry will involve determining whether the use
of a component of a claimed system caused a second party to use a
second component of the claimed system. Similar to focusing on the
309. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1318 (explaining that use of a system as a whole occurs when the com-
ponents are used collectively, not individually).
310. Akamai IV, 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1023.
314. Karshtedt, supra note 11, at 571.
315. See id.
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relationship between multiple actors, the causal responsibility inquiry
focuses on activity that has traditionally given rise to multi-party
liability.
In sum, this section has proposed an alternative way to think about
infringement of interactive system inventions. The proposed frame-
work shifts the focus away from examination of the beneficial use of
every system component. Instead, it suggests that to determine liabil-
ity, courts examine the relationship between the actors involved with
the alleged infringing system. The next section applies this framework
to a recent decision that relied on the absence of beneficial use to find
no evidence of infringement.
2. Revisiting Possible Infringement of Interactive Systems
This Section applies the framework suggested above for analyzing
infringement of interactive system claims to a recent non-precedential
Federal Circuit decision. In Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., the Federal
Circuit identified a gap in its jurisprudence concerning the use of in-
teractive system claims.316 Specifically, under what circumstances a
party might be liable for infringement when that party uses the system
but does not possess any components of the claimed system.317 Rely-
ing on Intellectual Ventures, the court concluded that such a party is
liable for infringement if it receives a benefit from each and every
claimed component of the system.318 The court did not elaborate on
what type of evidence might be required to satisfy its “beneficial use”
test.
How would this case be resolved if instead of focusing on “benefi-
cial use”, the court applied basic multi-party liability principles de-
scribed above? The key inquiry would be the relationship between the
alleged infringer, McDonald’s, and the provider of the allegedly in-
fringing system components. On the facts of this case, the provider of
the system components would include a credit card company such as
Visa or Mastercard.319 Here, the plaintiff would need to present evi-
dence that McDonald’s worked in concert with Visa to infringe the
claimed system. An arms-length transaction between the parties
would not rise to the level of liability. Instead, Grecia would have to
present evidence to support a conclusion that McDonald’s directed or
316. Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., 724 F. App’x 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the
court has not found controlling precedent to answer the question presented).
317. Id. at 945–46.
318. Id. at 947.
319. Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., 724 F. App’x 942, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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controlled Visa’s activities or that the parties worked as a joint enter-
prise to infringe the claimed system.320
Whether that occurred in this particular case is beyond the scope of
this Article. Instead, what is important is to note that the proposed
test provides a clear framework grounded in basic tort principles of
multi-actor liability. No new rules are created. Further, the broader
and clearer test will likely adapt better to unforeseen factual
situations.
CONCLUSION
This Article observes that the Federal Circuit’s recent interpretation
of “use” of a system is problematic. This problem is caused by the
court’s attempt to apply an outmoded framework to interactive inven-
tions. This Article suggests that interactive inventions should be
treated differently from traditional method and system inventions.
Further, it argues that a direct infringer uses an interactive system
when it controls the system and obtains a benefit from it. When inter-
active inventions are analyzed under the correct framework, it allows
for courts to apply sound legal principles to solve multi-actor liability
problems. This approach is more consistent with the recently articu-
lated standard in Akamai IV for divided infringement of method
claims.
Given the proliferation of interactive technologies, it is important to
understand what type of “use” of an interactive system or method will
give rise to liability for infringement. In recent years, the Federal cir-
cuit has expanded how to define use of an interactive method claim
through its divided infringement doctrine. In contrast, recent decisions
by the Federal Circuit have seemed to make it harder to enforce inter-
active system claims. This inconsistency is troubling given the emer-
gence of technology like the IoT.
For interactive system and method claims, key concepts include (1)
possession, (2) control, and (3) receipt of benefits. An alleged in-
fringer need not be in possession of an entire system to infringe a
system claim. However, an alleged infringer must control the system.
Finally, recent Federal Circuit decisions seem to suggest that an al-
leged infringer must receive a benefit from each and every claimed
element of the system. The element-by-element benefit test makes it
more difficult to enforce interactive system claims. This trend seems to
be at odds with other Federal Circuit decisions that have expanded
the test for how a distributed method claim might be infringed.
320. Akamai IV, 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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What explains this divergence of enforcement? Is it that the Federal
Circuit is less lenient with how claims will be drafted in system inven-
tions? Is it that distributed method claims impact more than just the
high-tech sector whereas most litigated system cases are just in the
high tech industry? This Article suggests that the inconsistency is due
to the lack of a framework for treating interactive inventions differ-
ently from traditional system and method claims.
One implication of recognizing that interactive inventions should be
treated differently is that it frees courts from attempting to apply a
rigid statutory framework. Instead, it allows courts to look to a
broader framework based on sound tort principles of multi-actor lia-
bility. One avenue for further research might include examining how
district courts have applied the Federal Circuit’s latest interpretations
of “use.” Another inquiry might be to examine a case where both in-
fringement of a system claim and method claim of an invention was at
issue and determine how the court navigated the issue of “use.”
It is important that the law provide predictability across technolo-
gies and types of claims. Interactive inventions can be used by more
than one actor. The fact that the courts have had to make doctrinal
adjustments over the last decade suggests that the current statutory
framework is not well equipped to deal with interactive inventions.
Once we acknowledge this new category, we no longer have to at-
tempt to deal with its unique problems using method or system claims
as a framework. Instead, all that is required is a shift in perspective.
Once we view an invention as interactive, we can employ a framework
for dealing with multi-actor liability. This framework is based in sound
principles of tort law, is predictable, and provides for consistent en-
forcement of both interactive method and system inventions.
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